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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis investigates the relationship between psychological metrics and economic risk 
behavior through a laboratory experiment (n=39). A better understanding of the influence of 
psychological traits on risk preferences could elucidate what drives human decisions under 
uncertainty and foster a better understanding of ideal portfolio compositions, the real world 
effects of economic policy, and consumer behavior. The experiment found that the 
psychological metrics examined, sensation seeking and impulsivity, had little to no predictive 
ability for economic risk behavior. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
We all have preferences in regard to risk. Finding the economically efficient, expected utility 
maximizing option is one thing, but many times our decisions are shrouded in more mystery. 
We don’t often pull out a pen and paper and calculate our best course of action. 
 
What guides these decisions, and what’s going on under the hood? Are more innate traits 
influencing our decision process? Economic models typically assume that people are rational 
actors, an assumption we know is not entirely true. It is valuable to examine mechanisms that 
may be drivers in our decision-making process to better understand how we actually think, 
and in turn how the predictions of those models may deviate from reality. 
 
Elucidation of factors that may be influencing how humans make economic decisions in the 
real world is useful to financial professionals in determining the optimal portfolio 
compositions for their clients, private businesses in providing a better understanding of 
consumer behavior, as well as to government institutions in understanding the real world 
effects of economic policy. 
 
EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
 
In order to investigate whether underlying psychological traits are significant drivers in 
decisions under uncertainty, an experiment was designed to determine if psychological metrics 
have any predictive ability for economic risk behavior of an individual. The experiment uses 
two psychological metrics: Arnett’s Inventory of Sensation Seeking, and Barratt’s 
	
4	
Impulsiveness Scale. The experiment also uses two economic metrics of risk aversion: the 
Holt-Laury (2002) method, and the Stahl (2016) sequence of framed lottery choices. 
 
Subjects were gathered from respondents to flyers, and were invited to a laboratory session. 
At these sessions the tasks were administered to subjects through a graphical user interface 
created using Python. Only one lottery choice, selected at random from either of the lottery 
choice tasks was resolved. The test was administered to 41 subjects. While there was no time 
limit for completion of the tasks, the majority of subjects took around 20 minutes to complete 
the experiment. Upon completion of all four tasks, the program randomly selected the 
occurring lottery and displayed subject’s selection on the lottery choice. Two ten-sided die 
were brought over, with each dice representing a digit on a scale of 0-99. Subjects then rolled 
the dice to determine the outcome of their choice on the selected lottery decision and, in turn, 
their compensation. 
 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
The finance industry has a particular interest in the relationship between personality indicators 
and risk preferences. Many finance professionals give clients questionnaires to attempt to 
estimate the ideal portfolio composition for a client’s personal risk preferences. Past research 
has utilized performance of traders in prediction markets to simulate real world risk behavior, 
and assessed the usefulness of personality questionnaires at predicting the influence of 
emotional regulation, risk, and cognition on trader’s behavior and outcome. This research 
found risk aversion to be positively correlated with the number of trade orders a subject 
submitted. It also found that the predictive ability of risk aversion was diminished when 
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metrics for emotional regulation were accounted for (Teschner, Kranz, and Weinhardt 2014). 
This still, however, suggests a possible connection between risk preferences and behavior that 
may be conventionally perceived as impulsive. 
 
There has also been research into the relationship between Myers Briggs Type Indicator 
(MBTI) personality assessments and the accuracy of one’s perception of probabilities (Yang, 
Coble, and Hudson 2009). This research doesn’t examine the relationship between risk 
behavior and Myers Briggs personality type directly, and instead includes a risk metric from 
the Holt Laury method as another potential predictor of the accuracy of probability 
perception. 
 
Some research has examined personality measures as metrics of risk behavior directly and has 
examined the usefulness of the Big Five personality test, the NEO PI-R, and biographical self-
reporting as metrics for risk behavior. These measures contain a number of similar questions 
to that of the AISS and BIS. This research found patterns within the Big Five personality test 
that are significantly correlated with high overall risk propensity (Nicholson et al. 2005).   
 
Other research has looked at the relationship between personality and risk behavior in more 
unconventional ways. One experiment utilizes uses a board game task as a method of 
evaluating both personality and risk behavior, and found risk taking to be positively correlated 
with impulsivity (Young et al. 2012). 
 
This study examines more specific psychological traits that could be involved in risk related 
decision processes. If these traits are significant influencers of risk behavior, and have also 
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been adequately defined, then isolated measurement of these traits may be a better predictor 
of risk behavior than more general methods of psychological evaluation, like the Big Five and 
MBTI personality assessments.  
 
It is difficult for a metric to accurately depict risk preferences in the real world, which are 
nuanced and influenced by many forms of uncertainty and biases. Kahneman and Tversky 
posit that prospect theory may be a more accurate model of decision making under uncertainty 
than expected utility theory, which assumes people have a full understanding of the possible 
outcomes and the probabilities of their occurrence. They identify a number of cognitive biases 
that may cause humans to systematically misevaluate risk. Many of these biases are related to 
the differences in humans’ evaluation of gains and losses, and aren’t relevant to the decisions 
in this experiment, where there are only gains. Some, however, like the overestimation of the 
likelihood of occurrence of very low probability outcomes, are relevant (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). These effects could potentially be stronger in individuals with higher levels 
of impulsivity or sensation seeking. 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL METRICS 
 
The trait of sensation seeking was first identified and defined by psychologist Marvin 
Zuckerman in 1964. Zuckerman defined sensation seeking as “the need for varied, novel, and 
complex sensations and experiences, and the willingness to take physical and social risks for 
the sake of such experiences” (Zuckerman et al. 1964). 
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Arnett’s Inventory of Sensation Seeking, or AISS (Arnett 1994) is a modified form of 
Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS). Arnett modified the SSS by removing questions 
inquiring about sexual behavior and drug use, as well as questions regarding strenuous 
activities so as not to bias the results by age. Arnett also changed the verbiage to not use dated 
terms like “queer” and “hippies.” 
 
Research has found the trait of sensation seeking relates with individuals’ likelihood to select 
high risk careers, engage in dangerous driving practices, use drugs and alcohol, and engage in 
certain forms of sexual behavior. 
 
While this trait is not directly connected to risk behavior, it is easy to conceive of their 
connection. For a sensation seeker, the risk associated with a potential choice may add to the 
excitement of choosing it, and in turn make it a more appealing choice within their own 
psyche.  
 
The AISS breaks out into two sub-components: novelty and intensity. These subcomponents 
are considered as two unique qualities which make up a sensation. A novel The sub-
component of intensity would likely relate more directly to economic risk, as these situations 
are both intense, and likely not novel. Odd numbered items in the AISS relate to the novelty 
sub-component, and even numbered items relate to the intensity sub-component. 
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Figure 1. AISS Items 
 
1.  I can see how it would be interesting to marry someone from a        
foreign country. 
 
2.  When the water is very cold, I prefer not to swim even if it is a hot 
day. 
   
3.  If I have to wait in a long line, I’m usually patient about it. 
  
4.  When I listen to music, I like it to be loud. 
 
5.  When taking a trip, I think it is best to make as few plans as 
possible and just take it as it comes. 
 
6.  I stay away from movies that are said to be frightening or highly 
suspenseful. 
 
7.  I think it’s fun and exciting to perform or speak before a group. 
 
8.  If I were to go to an amusement park, I would prefer to ride the 
rollercoaster or other fast rides. 
 
9.  I would like to travel to places that are strange and far away. 
 
10. I would never like to gamble with money, even if I could afford it. 
 
11. I would have enjoyed being one of the first explorers of an 
unknown land. 
 
12. I like a movie where there are a lot of explosions and car chases. 
 
13. I don’t like extremely hot and spicy foods. 
 
14. In general, I work better when I’m under pressure. 
 
15. I often like to have the radio or TV on while I’m doing something 
else, such as reading or cleaning up. 
 
16. It would be interesting to see a car accident happen. 
 
17. I think it’s best to order something familiar when eating in a 
restaurant. 
 
18. I like the feeling of standing next to the edge on a high place and 
looking down. 
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19. If it were possible to visit another planet or the moon for free, I 
would be among the first in line to sign up. 
 
20. I can see how it must be exciting to be in a battle during a war. 
 
Barratt’s Impulsiveness Scale, or BIS, seeks to measure the trait of impulsivity, or the tendency 
towards quick unplanned reactions without regard for negative consequences. This scale was 
modified for brevity, and only ten items of the scale are included (Patton and Barratt 1995). 
 
Impulsivity could quite conceivably be a factor in the process of evaluating lottery choices, 
high levels of which would lead subjects to select a lottery choice without truly evaluating the 
decision. This distortion of true risk preference is less likely to show itself in our data, as 
subjects know their decisions are being evaluated, and are potentially more likely to show care 
in their selections. 
 
Figure 2. BIS Items 
1.  I plan tasks carefully. 
2.  I do things without thinking. 
3.  I make-up my mind quickly.  
4.  I am happy-go-lucky. 
5.  I don't pay attention. 
6.  I have racing thoughts. 
7.  I plan trips well ahead of time. 
8.  I am self-controlled. 
9.  I concentrate easily. 
10. I save regularly. 
 
 
While these aspects of our psyche may be informed by our experience, base genetic levels may 
exist within an individual. It is important to consider the level to which these traits are mutable 
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in an individual, as the consistency of these metrics over time determines their usefulness as 
predictors in economic and business applications. 
 
Sensation seeking is possibly a genetic trait, and it has been suggested that our level of 
sensation seeking may come from our innate balance of neurotransmitters like dopamine, 
which provide our brains with a reward response when stimulated. No causal effect has been 
shown between increased dopamine production levels and thrill-seeking behavior, however 
there is a correlation (Derringer et al. 2010). While sensation seeking may have a genetic basis, 
metrics like AISS scores decrease with age, and thus do likely change over time. Despite this, 
a genetic baseline may exist for individuals. 
 
Both questionnaires are scored on Likert scales, meaning subjects choose a response indicating 
their level of agreement with the statement presented. Their response then indicates their 
intensity of feeling associated with the statement, or Likert item. The first response option for 
a Likert item is assigned a value of 1, the second assigned a value of 2, and so forth. Some 
Likert items are reverse scored, with the first response assigned a value of 4, the second a value 
of 3, and so forth. The score on each item is then summed to provide a total score. 
 
Data provided by Likert scales is not truly interval data, though it can be and is often 
interpreted as such. There is no way of knowing if there is a consistent change in intensity of 
feeling between each answer choice. That is to say changing ones answer from “strongly 
disagree” to “disagree” may not be the same amount of change in intensity as changing one’s 
answer from “disagree” to “neutral.” Despite this the ordinal data provided by Likert scales 
can be examined as quasi-interval. 
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We utilized 4 category Likert scales. By limiting the responses to each Likert item to an even 
number of choices the subject is forced to not select neutral responses, and instead truly 
evaluate the question they’re faced with. 
 
LOTTERY CHOICE TASKS 
 
The Holt-Laury task is a sequence of paired lottery choices, put forth by Charles Holt and 
Susan Laury, which indicates a subject’s level of risk tolerance. In these lotteries, the subject is 
given a choice between two options A and B, where option A always has a smaller spread of 
pay offs than option B. These payoffs are consistent throughout the questions, with the 
probability distribution in each task changing together, in 10 percent increments (Holt and 
Laury 2002). 
 
Figure 3. The Holt-Laury Method 
 
  
Task Safe Option (A) Risky Option (B) 
1 10% chance of $14 and 90% chance of $16 10% chance of $5 and 90% chance of $25 
2 20% chance of $14 and 80% chance of $16 20% chance of $5 and 80% chance of $25 
3 30% chance of $14 and 70% chance of $16 30% chance of $5 and 70% chance of $25 
4 40% chance of $14 and 60% chance of $16 40% chance of $5 and 60% chance of $25 
5 50% chance of $14 and 50% chance of $16 50% chance of $5 and 50% chance of $25 
6 60% chance of $14 and 40% chance of $16 60% chance of $5 and 40% chance of $25 
7 70% chance of $14 and 30% chance of $16 70% chance of $5 and 30% chance of $25 
8 80% chance of $14 and 20% chance of $16 80% chance of $5 and 20% chance of $25 
9 90% chance of $14 and 10% chance of $16 90% chance of $5 and 10% chance of $25 
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In T5, A and B have the same expected value ($15). We would thus expect a risk neutral 
individual to choose B for T1-T4, be indifferent for T5, and to choose A for T6-T9. A risk 
averse individual would switch to choice A before T5, and a risk loving individual after T5. 
 
Figure 4. Representation of a Lottery Choice in the Holt-Laury Task 
 
These choices were presented to my subjects as colored bars, with the size of the colored 
portion of each bar representing its corresponding payout.  
 
Subject responses are fit to a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, 
providing a comparable risk metric for subjects. 
 
Figure 5. Constant Relative Risk Aversion Utility Function    𝑈 𝑌 = 𝑌$%& 
 
The risk parameter, 𝜌, is a score on a risk index where 1 represents total risk aversion, 0 
represents risk neutrality, and a negative value represents risk loving preferences. 
 
The framed lottery choice task is a sequence of lottery choices that are more uncertain than 
those of the Holt Laury task. These lottery choices are a sequence set forth in Stahl (2016) 
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“Framing Lottery Choices”, which examines the effect the presentation of lottery choices has 
on subject behavior. 
 
Figure 6. Probability Distributions of Questions in Framed Lottery Choice Task 
Task 
Option Top Option Bottom 
P($5) P($15) P($25) P($5) P($15) P($25) 
1 0.05 0.55 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.80 
2 0.35 0.65 0.00 0.75 0.10 0.15 
3 0.25 0.05 0.70 0.10 0.65 0.25 
4 0.65 0.10 0.25 0.15 0.85 0.00 
5 0.25 0.65 0.10 0.40 0.05 0.55 
6 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.60 
7 0.20 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.70 0.30 
8 0.50 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.80 0.15 
9 0.35 0.60 0.05 0.55 0.00 0.45 
10 0.15 0.85 0.00 0.60 0.05 0.35 
11 0.30 0.05 0.65 0.10 0.65 0.25 
12 0.00 0.70 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.70 
13 0.10 0.75 0.15 0.35 0.05 0.60 
14 0.45 0.10 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.05 
15 0.45 0.05 0.50 0.15 0.80 0.05 
 
Figure 7. Representation of a Lottery Choice in the Framed Lottery Choice Task 
 
 
Lotteries were presented to subjects as colored bars, as before, with the length of each colored 
section representing the probability of occurrence for its corresponding payout. 
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These options, being both more subject to framing effects, and more difficult to 
mathematically evaluate, will allow for more behavioral biases to be present in the subject’s 
decision process. This task simulates an environment most similar to real life choices, which 
are varied and have some ambiguity. Risk metrics are again created by fitting subject responses 
to a CRRA utility function. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Two individuals were removed from the sample as outliers. These individuals switched back 
and forth repeatedly in their choice between the risky and safe lotteries in the Holt-Laury task. 
As there were no meaningful metrics of economic risk behavior for these subjects, they were 
removed from the sample. 
 
Figure 8. Summary of Psychological Metrics 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
AISS total 39 54.5897 8.4033 38 74 
Novelty subscore 39 25.7692 5.5415 15 38 
Intensity subscore 39 28.8205 4.0708 22 38 
BIS total 39 70.2307 13.9141 45 105 
 
AISS and BIS scores have a roughly normal distribution. This would likely be more apparent 
with a larger sample size. Within the AISS, the mean novelty subscore is higher than the mean 
intensity subscore. BIS scores were, as expected, strongly correlated with AISS scores (.5075). 
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Figure 9. Summary of Risk Metric r by Treatment. 
 
Only 5 of 38 subjects (13.2%) demonstrated risk loving behavior (r < 0) in the framed lottery 
choice task, and there is essentially no correlation between the total AISS score and subject 
risk behavior in the framed lottery choice task. Note that the mean risk metric is not statistically 
significantly different from 0 in either task (mean=.2049 sd=.4174; mean=.3816 sd=.3232), 
and that as anticipated the standard deviation is greater for the framed lottery choice task. 
 
Figure 10. Correlations of the Risk Metrics with the Psychological Metrics 
	 AISS total 
score 
Novelty 
subscore 
Intensity 
subscore 
Difference of 
novelty and 
intensity subscores 
BIS 
score 
Risk metric in framed  
lottery choice task 
-.0176 
 
-.1661 .0954 -.2463 -.2345 
Risk metric in Holt-
Laury task 
-.0683 -.0684 .0533 -.0034 -.0357 
 
There is essentially no correlation at the 5% significance level between the total AISS score 
and subject risk metric in the framed lottery choices. There is a non-statistically significant 
positive correlation between the AISS intensity subscore and risk behavior in the framed 
lottery choices. There is also a non-statistically significant negative correlation between the 
AISS novelty subscore and risk behavior in the framed lottery choices. Though it is not 
statistically significant it is signed as we expect; as an individual’s novelty subscore increases, 
they demonstrate less risk averse behavior in the framed lottery tasks.  
Treatment	 N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
framed  
lottery choice task 
39 .2049 .4174 -.9117 1 
Holt-Laury task 39 .3816 .3232 -.3006 1 
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There is also a non-statistically significant negative correlation between BIS scores and subject 
risk metric in the framed lottery choices, though this was larger than either of the AISS 
subscores. Though it is not statistically significant, it is signed as we’d expect, and shows that 
as an individual’s intensity subscore increases, they demonstrate more risk averse behavior in 
the framed lottery tasks.  
 
The sub traits of sensation seeking have opposite effects on the risk behavior of individuals. 
This is not in line with expectations. We hypothesized both higher novelty and higher intensity 
subscores to lead to more risk loving behavior. Behavior in the Holt-Laury task is, as expected, 
correlated with behavior in the lottery choice task with a correlation of .5053 (α = .01).  
 
We estimate a multiple linear regression to determine if some combination of psychological 
metrics is an effective predictor of risk behavior in either the framed lottery choice task or the 
Holt-Laury task. 
 
Figure 11. Multiple Linear Regression 𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌	𝒎𝒆𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄 = 	𝜷𝟎 +	𝜷𝟏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒕𝒚 +	𝜷𝟐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 +	𝜷𝟑𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚 + 	𝜺 
 
In both regressions subject risk metric is the dependent variable, with AISS score, BIS score, 
and novelty and intensity subscores as the independent variables.  
 
 
 
	
17	
Figure 12. Regression Estimates for the Framed Lottery Choice Task 
 
 
Figure 13. Regression Estimates for the Holt-Laury Task 
 
 
Both regressions explain very little of the variation within the dataset, with no significant beta 
coefficients at the 5% significance level. 
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Item 10 of the AISS was isolated and examined separately, as it relates directly to economic 
risk. Subject responses to this item (“I would never like to gamble with money, even if I could 
afford it”) had little bearing on subjects’ risk behavior in either of the lottery choice tasks. Two 
subjects reported that they strongly disagreed with the statement despite always choosing the 
safer option even when it was economically worse in the framed lottery choice task.  
 
Figure 14. Risk Metric of Framed Lottery Choice Task and AISS Item 10 Response
 
 
We would expect individuals who describe themselves as more likely to engage in gambling 
to demonstrate more risk loving behavior, and thus a lower risk metric. Instead, subject 
answers to this question have little to no predictive ability for risk behavior, as shown in 
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figure 12. This provides further evidence that subject scores in these psychological metrics 
have little bearing on economic behavior. This could be due to the inaccuracy of self-
evaluation; it may be the case that risk loving individuals don’t view their choices as gambles, 
and for this reason act accordingly. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
These psychological metrics are poor predictors of selection in both the framed lottery and 
Holt-Laury tasks. It is possible that the concepts of impulsivity and sensation seeking are 
largely divorced from economic decision making. Risk preferences may be separate for 
different types of risk. In this case, impulsivity sensation seeking could have little influence on 
economic risk behavior, but still influence behavior in situations carrying more personal or 
physical risk. It could also be the case that impulsivity and sensation seeking are relevant in 
economic decision making, and that AISS and BIS scores are weak metrics and inaccurate in 
determining subjects’ levels of sensation seeking and impulsivity.  
 
It is also possible that self-evaluation of these traits may be too inaccurate to provide a reliable 
metric. As evidenced by comparison of subject risk behavior and response to item 10 of the 
AISS. 
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